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Field Marshall Douglas Haig: A Negative
Leadership Lesson in Military History
Major Joshua E. Kastenberg
Professional military education course materials con- correct initial errors in judgment. (This includes Mont-
tain some analysis on leadership, and in particular gomery who became something of a casualty to the
military leadership. By the time a student completes Patton versus Montgomery "battles.")
Air Command and Staff College, he or she British military history - and to an ex-
will have read brief passages on Dwight tent our own - is also replete with exam-
Eisenhower, George Patton, John J. Per- ples of inflexible commanders failing to
shing, Omar Bradley, and - though not a both recognize errors in judgment, and
personal favorite of this author - Douglas plans that went awry. Moreover, a com-
MacArthur. (Of note, Chester Nimitz is mon companion to this inflexibility was
given short shrift). More attention is reluctance in other officers, stationed
placed on successful military leaders than within the commander's inner circle, to
on unsuccessful and unpopular ones. Few advocate a need for flexibility and
officers study, in any detail, the failings of change. In some instances a cult of per-
George B. McClellan, George A. Custer sonality developed around a leader by his
Lloyd Fredendall, or even William West- complimentary subordinates. This was a
moreland. frequent criticism of the Civil War era
Likewise, there is a dearth of time spent Union generals, McClellan in particular,
on the leadership qualities of foreign offi- prior to Ulysses Grant assuming overall
cers. Thus, for example, while Napoleon is generally command.
known to been innovative, hardly any analysis of his Foremost among the examples of bloody-
charisma, personality, decision making, and innate mindedness is Field Marshal Douglas Haig, the com-
intelligence occurs. What can military officers, or for mander of the WWI British Expeditionary Force
that matter the JAG Corps learn from such a study? A (BEF) from 10 December 1915 through the end of
great deal. Below is one very brief analysis of leader- hostilities on 11 November 1918. Nothing in Haig's
ship, as pertinent to today's military (and JAG Corps), background suggests he was any more ill-suited to
as at any time. command the BEF than any other senior officer. Born
"Bloody Mindedness"
There is a leadership trait coined by British military
scholars describing a commander steeped in his own
confidence to the point of inflexibility. "Bloody-
mindedness" evokes images of stolid and unflinching
British generals, ordering regiments into the fray. In
their great military tradition, which includes excep-
tional commanders such as Horatio Nelson, Arthur
Wellsley (the Duke of Wellington), Field Marshal Ber-
nard Montgomery, and Field Marshal William Slim, a
common trait of extreme self-confidence and absolute
competence is found. However, each of these indi-
viduals possessed both an intellect and ego able to
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in 1861 to a wealthy aristocratic family - who made
their fortune as whiskey distillers - he was educated at
both Oxford University and Sandhurst, Britain's pre-
mier military academy. He admitted that did not read
much, and appeared to be bound by the prejudices of
the day. (He viewed French officers as inferior, not
only because they were French, but also because many
of them had risen through the lower classes).
Haig was described by his contemporaries as distant,
cold, and self-assured. Winston Churchill, who
worked alongside him as the First Lord of the Admi-
ralty, and later the mister of munitions likened Haig to
a 19th century surgeon who was proficient at his job,
but unfeeling toward his patients. Pain was not his
concern and if a patient died on the operating table, the
doctor would simply move on to the next. David
Llyod George, Prime Minister after 1916 described
Haig as incompetent, and "refusing to see his own er-
rors in judgment." Haig commanded troops in India,
the Sudan, and South Africa, seeing combat in each.
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In these colonial battles, Haig led from the front of
cavalry charges. There was never any hint of coward-
ice.
There were inherent flaws in the British system of
commissioning officers. Britain had abolished the
purchase system of ranks by the time Haig received his
commission in 1885, and as a result, his professional
advancement occurred through the contemporary
flawed merit based process. However, the British
Army remained encumbered by a class-based system,
and it was exceedingly rare for an officer to have not
come from an aristocratic or wealthy background.
Ethnic and religious minorities, including Catholics,
were unlikely to advance in rank. A World War II
British general, Sir Brian Horrocks commented that,
having all come from a similar background, the World
War One-era generals "were predicable, unimagina-
tive, and dull, in military matters." In the modem era,
we might add that diversity was not a desirable feature
of the prewar British officer corps.
The prewar enlisted ranks tended to come from the
lower economic echelons of British society. They
served lengthy enlistments in what was a strenuous
disciplinary system. A number of colonial-era wars
afforded the British army its combat experience. In
1914, the small BEF possessed the best trained and
disciplined regiments in the world. However, it was
unimaginatively lead and very small in comparison to
the continental armies. Through the initial two years
of the war, the British Army was composed entirely of
volunteers, 500,000 of whom enlisted in the first three
months. Conscription did not occur until late 1916.
As late as 1914 Haig believed that cavalry retained a
place of prominence on the battlefield. He viewed the
machine gun as a luxury and aviation as unnecessary.
He had little relationship to the individual soldier, and
his view of training was antiquated to the needs of
modem warfare. Haig believed in frontal assaults with
large masses of men instead of using small units to
probe for weaknesses in the enemy lines. He felt that
small unit actions required too much training with little
final benefit. Haig was not alone in these views al-
though other officers voiced opposition to these beliefs
late in the war.
The Setting: World War One
World War I was unlike any prior war in its size and
scope. On the western front, a continuous line of
trenches ran for over 400 miles from Switzerland to
the English Channel. A century of imperial growth
stemming from the demands of industrialism, smaller
wars driven by ethnic nationalism, and a variety of
political instabilities made likely the possibility of a
Europe-wide war. From 1871 onwards the major
world powers, with the exception of the United States,
formed into two alliances with Germany, Austria-
Hungary, and Italy on the one side, and the British
Empire, France, and Russia - known as the Triple En-
tente - on the other. When war broke out in July and
August 1914, only Italy remained absent from the alli-
ance system. By the following year, the Ottoman Em-
pire and Bulgaria joined Germany, while Italy and
Japan joined the Entente.
For the first two years of the war on the western
front, a common strategy for each side was to amass
large numbers of men and artillery against a section of
the enemy's well enforced trench lines. It rarely
worked because even when a breakthrough occurred,
the opposing forces were able to dig into a secondary
line. Additionally, according to the eminent military
historian John Keegan, a single machine gun was ca-
pable of spitting out 600 rounds per minute - or having
the effectiveness of over a platoon of infantry. Even
the introduction of new weapons such as aircraft - pri-
marily for reconnaissance, poison gas, and ever larger
artillery, such as the 420-millimeter howitzer, could be
defensively overcome. Instead of trying to find alter-
native methods of combat, the French and British
chiefs resorted to using even larger numbers of men.
Typically both staff officers and commanding gener-
als had little concept of the conditions of this new type
of warfare where the defense retained an advantage.
Soldiers lived across this four hundred-mile plus
stretch of frontline trenches. They slept in bunkers and
even during lull times were exposed to rifle and ma-
chine gun fire, artillery strikes, liquid fire, mine war-
fare, aerial bombardment, and poison gas. They ate
poorly, were infested by vermin, and were sent out on
night patrols and raids where only a fraction of their
number returned. They suffered through the booming
sounds of artillery rounds coming from their own
guns. They lived in vigilance of enemy raids and pa-
trols, as well as an all out attack. Mostly though, they
waited for the sound of a whistle, an unmistakable
order to attack.
When the whistle blew, these men went "over the
top." This was the most dangerous time of all. As
they slogged across "no mans land," often weighted
down by forty or more pounds of equipment, they
were openly exposed to the enemy's machine gun and
rifle fire, artillery, and flamethrowers. Ifthey met
their initial objective, the enemy front lines, they had
to hold this position against an inevitable counter-
attack. In a typical attack, a British company of men,
numbering about 100, could expect to lose a quarter of
their number just gaining an objective
Haig referred to the daily casualty reports, often
numbering in the thousands, as "My daily wastage."
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According to his son, Haig visited the front trenches
only once because the smell of mass death made him
sick, and he felt that he could not effectively command
when this occurred.
Prelude and Failure: 1 July 1916
On 21 February 1916, the German High Command
launched Operation Gericht (Operation Judgment)
against a French stronghold near Verdun. The High
Command decided to destroy the French Army before
their British ally was able to increase the size of their
forces in the Western Front. In five months the French
Army suffered 162,308 killed and over 300,000 more
wounded. The French barely held on against German
attacks, and desperately needed the British to take the
offensive.
Since the start of the war, the British Army built
itself from a force of roughly 250,000 men into a force
of over two million. British imperial forces had en-
gaged in large scale combat operations outside of the
western front - notably against Turkey - and medium
sized operations in France. In May 1916, Haig de-
cided to amass several divisions numbering 120,000
men for an assault against the German lines in Flan-
ders. He was, however, convinced by the French gen-
eral in charge, Joseph Joffre, to attack in a combined
offensive with available French forces along the
Somme River. On 24 June 1916, British artillery
began to shell German lines in a continuous bombard-
ment. Very few Germans were killed as a result of the
bombardment though survivors later claimed they suf-
fered horrific shell shock. The primary reason for a
lack of German deaths was their well-engineered, rein-
forced dugouts, deep under the chalky Picardy soil.
On the morning of 1 July 1916, the whistles blew
and British soldiers went "over the top." Haig ex-
pected a complete breakthrough. After all, a week-
long artillery barrage, complete air superiority, and the
bulk of the German Army fighting at Verdun made a
breakthrough seem very likely. But a breakthrough
did not occur. British forces suffered astounding casu-
alties: over 19,000 killed and 40,000 wounded, on this
first day alone. The day was a complete failure. In
fact, 1 July 1916 has been called the worst day in Brit-
ish history. Yet, that very evening, Haig reported to
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that, in his
view, the day was a success.
The Aftermath
Despite the first day's failure, the battle continued
through November. Tactics changed little throughout
the battle, and the allies lost a total 210,000 killed for a
gain of less than ten miles. (The German Army lost
around 180,000). Throughout the battle he and his
immediate subordinates continued to view the small
gains - at incredibly high cost - as evidence of success.
Haig and his primary subordinates had no problem
reporting these views of success to the military and
political leadership in Britain. There was a disconnect,
however, between their views and the actual gains of
territory. First, no breakthrough in the German lines
ever occurred. Second, the gains that did occur
throughout the battle were typically objectives Haig
had expected to take on 1 July.
Today there is a monument on the battlefield's high
ground, Theipval. The monument lists the names of
70,000 British Empire soldiers whose bodies were
never recovered in identifiable form. A tourist will
find that between the towns of Albert and Peronne to
the east and west, and Baupame to the north, the coun-
tryside is dotted with well-kept Imperial and Common-
wealth War Graves Commission cemeteries. As late
as this year, the farmers of the local area have un-
earthed human remains and, the "iron harvest" - refer-
ring to the ongoing finds of shells and other war detri-
tus - continues.
The Somme battle did not produce a decisive result,
nor did it change the overall thinking of the BEFs
commanding general and his staff. Indeed, in the fall
of 1917, utilizing similar tactics and strategic thinking,
the BEF attacked the German lines at Ypres in yet
another big push. This battle has been alternatively
called Third Ypres (the British had already fought two
other battles there) or Passchendaele. This time the
British suffered 120,000 battle deaths over a four-
month period. Despite the huge numbers of men com-
mitted, neither the Somme nor Third Ypres was deci-
sive in ending the war. In fact, the German Army was
able to launch a series of full-scale offensives in that
same area in the spring and summer of 1918.
Application to the Air Force Core Values and the
JAG Corps
The likelihood of trench warfare recurring rests
somewhere between the categories of "never," and
"very remote." Moreover our officer corps largely
exists on a merit based promotion and assignment sys-
tem. Class structures, never popular in the United
States, hardly even exist in Britain today. Judge Ad-
vocates will not command regiments, divisions, or
armies. The mindset of Haig, however, remains a sali-
ent leadership lesson for a number of reasons.
Haig presents a poignant reminder that knowledge of
the field remains important at all levels of authority.
This includes listening to the forces "in the field"
where improvements and innovation tend to originate.
The oft-repeated statement, "flexibility is the key to
airpower," recognizes this tendency. To the JAG
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Corps, it may mean nothing more than senior officers
seeking process feedback from subordinates, and lis-
tening to this feedback with an open mind in such ar-
eas as military justice, operations law, and contracting.
It also extends to informal climate assessments where
leadership can gauge its own effectiveness.
Another application has to do with the nature of
command and responsibility. After WWI, several gen-
erals and politicians claimed to harbor reservations
about Haig's approach to the Somme and Passchedaele
operations. Uniformly, none of them sought an active
engagement with Haig over his vision for victory. Had
Haig's subordinates approached him with their misgiv-
ings about his tactical, operational, and strategic plans,
the Somme might have had a different result. No
leader is flawless, yet the more confident a leader is,
the less likely a subordinate is to respectfully approach
a leader's plan with suggested alternatives. Axiomatic
to this observation is the behavioral trait that the more
confident a leader is, the more that leader ought to
seek input and feedback. One of Haig's great weak-
nesses was his reluctance to seek any feedback. Had
he listened to the reports and warnings from four
brigadier generals on the night of 1 July 1916, he
might have ended the battle. Instead, on 2 July 1916,
he informed Prime Minister Herbert Asquith that the
battle was "an enormous success." His immediate
commanders went willingly along with Haig's 2 July
assessment. Even as the battle continued, Haig re-
ported exaggerated and excessive gains and German
defeats. His immediate army commanders supported
these reports. It was not until the conclusion of the
war where political recriminations began that these
commanders expressed they had inner doubts about
the battle, but failed to voice these doubts. Here, there
was a failure both in integrity and excellence.
The failure to voice doubts throughout the battle
might have not only spared lives, but placed the British
forces in a position where they could have ended the
war earlier than 1918. To be sure, the BEF would ulti-
mately have to engage in battle, but other factors
worked to weaken the German position including the
naval blockade surrounding Germany. One of our
core Air Force values is "service before self." This
value has its roots as an expression against the very
type of subordinate conduct found in the British Army
of WWI, or for that matter, the Civil War era leader-
ship under McClellan. Every officer wants to achieve
a promotion, and there is an inherent risk in opposing a
commanding officer's plans. However, the overall cost
to a military institution can be devastating. For the
BEF, it meant the expenditure of over one million lives
between 1914 and 1918. This does not suggest that
WWI was not a worthwhile conflict. Indeed, on the
western front it pitted three democracies against a to-
talitarian regime bent on destroying twentieth century
freedoms and creating a new world order based on its
belief in Germanic ethnic supremacy. There is a dis-
tinct difference between fighting a worthwhile con-
flict, and fighting an intelligently led worthwhile con-
flict. This is little different for the JAG corps. For
example, there is a difference between prosecuting a
case to the desired result, and prosecuting a case
smartly, where the image of a fair and professional
military justice system is maintained.
Finally, the profession of arms requires adherence to
standards of conduct beyond what is expected in civil-
ian communities. These standards of conduct rein-
force both external and internal confidence in military
leadership. A lack of confidence degrades mission
effectiveness. By late 1917 British soldiers could be
heard bleating like sheep when they passed high-
ranking staff officers. The French Army mutinied in
the trenches in that same year. Neither force regained
its full effectiveness until the arrival of the American
forces in large numbers in the summer of 1918. The
mission degradation did not occur because Haig and
his French counterparts failed to adhere to our current
core values, but a common denominator is the loss of
confidence in military leadership. This is why guard-
ing the merit based promotion system, and adherence
to core values is so important. Simply put, a wide-
spread lack of confidence in leadership degrades the
effectiveness of the JAG corps. Corruption, if it oc-
curs in a merit based promotion and assignment sys-
tem, has a similar degrading effect. In Haig's time, the
BEF possessed in inherent flaw where an officer's
"breeding," was still thought to have a relation to the
officer's ability. In our current military and JAG
Corps, unchecked favoritism means that officers of
ability may be deprived of the opportunity to fully
contribute to the various important missions of the
JAG Corps. Favoritism stemming from unprofessional
relationships, a distinct failure in integrity, is a degrad-
ing force to effectiveness. Both the core values and
high expectations of leadership are directly influential
to mission effectiveness. So too is the need to guard
against the Haig leadership style.
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